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It will be noted that Florida has been in accord with the latter view. 1
A depositor for collection can recall his paper before collection on de-
mand and can recover the proceeds wherever they may be and the in-
solvency of any agent or sub-agent possessing his paper or the proceeds
does not affect his right to recover the same.12 In a jurisdiction where
the opposite view as to liability of the agent prevails, it was held that
payment to a sub-agent was payment to the agent itself and it at once
became a debtor to the depositor.s But a lower federal court held that
where a sub-agent made a collection and sent his own draft in payment
to the principal agent, he was still liable as a trustee until the draft was
paid, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.14
Accordingly, since, in the instant case, defendant bank was merely an
agent and not liable to the owner of the paper for the default of the St.
Petersburg bank, and since the latter bank was liable to the owner of the
paper, the set off was rightfully refused. P. C. R.
BILLS AND NOTES-ACCOMMODATION MAXER-HOLDER FOR VALUF--The
facts found by the trial court were as follows: Appellee Myers was in-
duced by fraudulent representations to purchase worthless oil stock for
which she gave her note. This note was discounted at appellant bank by
the cashier who had participated in the fraud. Some time later appellant
bank informed appellee Myers that before it could effect a consolidation
according to an agreement into which it had entered, it would be necessary
to show that the note was paid and requested her to give another note
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uBrov~n v. Peoples Say. Bank, 29 Fla. 163, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 608, 52 So. 719.
l2 Evansville Old Nat. Bank v. German-American Bank, 155 U. S. 556, 15 S.
Ct. 221, 39 L. ed. 259; Commercial Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, 13 Sup.
Ct. 533, 37 L. ed. 363; White v. Miner's Nat. Bank, 102 U. S. 658, 26 L. ed. 250;
Crown Point First Nat. Bank v. Richmond First Nat. Bank, 76 Ind. 561, 40
Am. Rep. 261.
1 Reeves v. State Bank, 8 0. St. 465.
' Holder v. Western German Bank, 136 Fed. 90, 68 C. C. A. 554.
RECENT CASE NOTES
for a lesser sum and a check for the balance. The bank knew that there
were no funds available to meet the check. Appellee Myers gave the note
and check, then under threats of prosecution for issuing the check, at the
suggestion of the bank, procured the note in suit which was signed by her
sister, appellee Parr, as an accommodation maker. Appellee Myers in-
dorsed this note to the bank and received the unpaid check. The bank
promised to surrender the note and accept another from appellee Myers
as soon as the consolidation was effected, but brought suit instead. Held,
that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that
the bank was not a holder in due course because it had knowledge of the
fraud, and that the absence of consideration constitutes a defense against
the holder of an accommodation note who is not a holder in due course
because of some fact other than knowledge of accommodation.1
Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that an accom-
modation party to a negotiable note is liable on the instrument to a "holder
for value" notwithstanding that such holder at the time of taking the
instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party2 Obviously it
would be unjust to permit an accommodation party to set up the defense
of no consideration, since his very purpose is to enable the accommodated
person to obtain credit on the faith of his name. The only element of
confusion is in the interpretation of the phrase "holder for value." Some
text writers 3 and at least one of the few cases on this point go so far as
to hold4 that this section of the Negotiable Instruments Law permits a
"holder for value" to recover from an accommodation maker even though
he knew that the instrument had been obtained by fraud, or had notice of
other defects which would prevent him from being a holder in due course.
This section, considered alone and without regard to policy, might justify
such an interpretation, but in view of Section 58 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Laws which provides that "in the hands of any holder other than a
holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to the same de-
fenses as if it were nonnegotiable" it would seem that the court's holding
in the principal case that the phrase merely means that "the absence of
consideration between accommodated and accommodating parties does not
of itself constitute a defense against a holder" is right both in logic and
justice. An opposite decision would give the holder of accommodation
paper greater rights than the holder of other negotiable instruments.6 As
pointed out in a leading case7 accommodation paper plays a very important
part in the commercial world, and to deprive the accommodating party of
'National City Bank v. Parr (1933), 185 N. E. 904 (Ind. Sup. CL).
2Burns' Ann. Statutes 1926, See. 11388. For cases decided under this section
see: Walker v. Reese (1930), (Kan.), 289 Pac. 425; Miller v. Stuart (1927), 69
Utah 250, 253 Pac. 900; Naef v. Potter (1907), 226 Ill. 403, 129 N. E. 149; First
National Bank of Aberdeen v. Thompson (1929), (Kan.), 227 N. W. 81; New Haven
Bank v. Jordan Co. (1918), (Conn.), 104 Ati. 392; Mlarling v. Jones (1909), 138
Wise. 82, 119 N. W. 931; First National Bank of Willmar v. Malmquist (1924), 158
Minn. 140, 197 N. W. 271.
'Professor Herring (1910-11), 59 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 471, 532.
'Marling v. Jones (1909), 138 Wise. 82, 119 N. W. 931.
: Burns' Ann. Statutes 1926, See. 11417.
'Brennan's Negotiable Instruments Law (Sth ed.), p. 390.
7 4Cottrell v. Walker (1893), 89 Va. 801, 17 S. E. 328.
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defenses available to other parties to a negotiable instrument would tend
to suppress this class of paper and cripple business transactions.
Having once decided that a purchaser for value must also be a holder
in due course, the court had no difficulty in holding that the bank could
not recover, since the note in suit was a renewal of the original notes
executed by appellee Myers, and the bank would take the renewal note
subject to the same defenses as the original notes.
Undoubtedly the principal case is correct both on principle and au-
thority,8 and is an excellent example of thorough analysis and application
of all the pertinent sections of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
A. A. C.
HABruAL CRIMINAL AcT-CoNsTITuTIoNALITY-EvMDENCE-Defendant
was charged by a grand jury indictment with assault and battery with
intent to kill and with being an habitual criminal, as provided by the
Indiana Statutes. There was a verdict of guilty of the crime of assault
and battery with intent to kill as charged and a finding that the defendant
had been convicted of a felony, on two previous occasions, and imprisoned
for the offenses committed. The court sentenced the defendant to the
state prison for life as an habitual criminal. Defendant appealed, assign-
ing as error the introduction of evidence in proof of the prior convictions
as prejudicial, and attacking the constitutionality of the Habitual Crimi-
nal Act, claiming it to be a denial of the equal protection of the law. The
verdict of the trial court was affirmed.1
The Indiana Habitual Criminal Act2 is in accordance with the general
legislative thought throughout the country, practically every state having
a similar statute.3 Although the Act has been in effect in Indiana since
1907, yet its punishment has seldom been invoked, the convictions under
itf-averaging one a year.4 The writer thinks this is not due to the amount
of data available for identification but to the failure of the public officials
to use that which is available;5 IndianaO and the Federal Department of
Justice7 both maintaining bureaus of identification. And further, the
present undeveloped status of our criminal identification constitutes a
a Pacific-Southwest Trust and Savings Bank v. Valley Finance Corporation
(1929), 99 Cal. App. 728, 279 Pac. 222; Weiser National Bank v. Peters (1927),
174 Ark. 984, 298 S. W. 878; Bartels v. Suther (1928), 130 Okla. 7, 266 Pac. 753;
Wilholt v. Seavall (1926), 121 Kan. 239, 246 Pac. 1013; (1924) 24 Col. Law
Rev. 791.
'Barr v. State (1933), 187 N. E. 259 (Ind.).2 Burns' Ann. Stat. (1926), 2339, 2340.
$Oregon Laws (1921), c. 70; Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington 1922), § 2286;
W. Va. Code Ann. (Barnes 1923), c. 152, § 24; N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (Supp. 1926),
c. 41, §§ 1942-3; Cal. St. 1927, p. 1066 (amending see. 644 Penal Code) ; Iowa Sec-
tion 1964 (1) of Code of 1924; Conn. Indeterminate Sentence Act (Gen. St. 1918,
§ 6660); Ohio Laws 82, 237; MJnn. section 4772, R. L. 1905; Ill. Laws 1883, p. 76;
Okla. Laws 1911, c. 70; Mass. St. 1887, c. 435; Missouri Rev. St. 1909, c. 4913.
'Report of Indiana Committee on Observance and Enforcement of Law, Jan-
uary 5, 1931.
5Frank 0. Lowden, Criminal Statistics and Identification of Criminals, 19
Journal of Criminal Law 36.
$Burns' Ann. Stat. 1929, Supp. 2409, 1-2409.12.
7United States Code Ann. 5:300.
